Rusting out into the sunset - is it the end for the Royal Canadian Navy?

The Canadian Navy is an organisation that I’ve long been fascinated by - its history, culture and quiet decline in size, but not professionalism are simultaneously gripping and tragic. In many ways the Commonwealth Navies represent a vision of what could come to pass for the Royal Navy in years to come if sufficient funding isn’t allocated to it.

The one constant in recent Canadian naval history is the deep reluctance of Canadian politicians to actually order warships (proper warships), but instead rely on a legion of powerpoint presentations to talk about Canadas great naval future on whichever planned shipbuilding programme is in vogue that day.

The root of Canadian problems in recent years stems back to a lack of funding to replace the two classes of ship that have really made up the mainstay of the Canadian fleet since the end of the Cold War – the Iroquois class destroyers (the 280s) and the Halifax class frigates (330s). The 280s have their roots in the early 1960s, optimised as four big helicopter carrying destroyers intended to tackle soviet submarines in a cold war conflict. Heavily modernised throughout the Cold War and beyond, they have long been worked hard and are in challenging material state. Two were paid off in June, but one (HMCS ATHABASKAN) continues on, now well past 40 years old.

The 330s were optimised as ASW frigates to replace the post war construction types (Canada built a variety of excellent modified Type 12 frigates) and provide a more modern capability to the fleet during the much needed 1980s modernisation period (a time which even saw the Canadians contemplate acquisition of SSNs). A total of 12 hulls were built, entering service from 1992 by two shipyards which were effectively established to build them, but then failed to secure any follow on orders.  The result has been that since the mid-1990s, the Canadians have had to rely on two primary ship classes, getting ever older, but without any sign of actual hulls hitting the water (or even having steel cut) to replace them.

Meanwhile their tanker situation got even worse, originally there were three tankers (the Protector class) dating back to the 1960s which provided the fleet train capability. Age and infirmity has again reared its ugly head and these vessels have all now been paid off without (to date) replacement. In the interim Canada has been contemplating a variety of alternatives, including the chartering of tanker ‘sea days’ from nations like Spain and Chile, and deploying contingents onto foreign vessels to keep critical maritime skills alive.

Today there are two great hopes for the future of Canadian procurement – firstly the existence of Joint Support Ships (essentially a heavily modified Berlin class AOR) and a Single Surface Combatant intended to provide 15 escort ships against a total budget of some nearly $30 billion . In reality both programmes seem highly unlikely to deliver as anticipated – the SSC programme has been through various iterations, and yet despite this the number of hulls planned has never officially dropped down, despite inflation and other costs occurring. In 2011 a contract was awarded worth $25 billion to build new escorts and tankers for the Canadian Navy, but to date steel has not been cut on a single vessel.

The plan appears to be to construct some form of design in Canada (whether foreign or home design is not completely clear yet) through a single company. This in turn was intended to provide 15 hulls optimistically hitting the water from 2018 onwards. To put this in sharp perspective, Canada is currently contemplating trying to establish a highly complex warship construction facility from scratch, to build, integrate, operate and deploy these vessels in a hugely ambitious time frame, when it is nearly 20 years since they last went through a similar process.

What is likely in reality is that the programme will further slip, that there will not be vessels in the water as planned and that the budget which is going to be ever more challenged will not be available to afford anywhere near as many as 15 hulls. The RCN is likely to find itself in a similar situation to the RN over the Type 45 programme which went from 12 planned hulls to 6, but the cost savings were minimal as production costs decrease as programmes continue due to efficiencies of scale. In other words Canada will be paying more for less…

In practical terms, we appear to be near the point where Canada ceases to have a credible blue water navy. With a surface fleet where the youngest escort is 19 years old, and with credible replacements realistically half a decade away, it is hard to see how the Canadians can continue to operate at the high end of the warfighting spectrum with taking serious and significant risks.

Halifax Class Frigate

The one tiny glimmer of hope is that there are plans afoot to do an enormously ambitious and complex conversion of a merchant ship into a stop gap AOR to provide a limited tanker capability (replacing 3 platforms with 1) for a limited time until the putative JSS arrive. In reality the programme (known as Project Resolve) will provide a short term (2-3 year) cover but one cannot help but suspect that this make-work solution will in time become the only tanker left to the Canadians. It seems unlikely that having provided this ship, that she will be disposed of so quickly, particularly if construction continues and budgets tighten. That of course assumes the conversion works to time and to cost, which can never be assured.

Whatever the end, the reality is that for several years to come, Canada will be without a credible tanker on at least one coast, and reliant on the largesse and goodwill of NATO or Pacific Rim allies to support her ships on deployment.  Why does this matter so much? Well the imminent demise of a NATO navy is never a good sign – it’s something that reduces the number of credible warships available to commit to NATO missions, and increases the burden on those countries who do have vessels.

It highlights the reality that warship building is an immensely complex and time consuming business – if you drop out of the game and take a gap, even for a short time, the skills fade is considerable, as is the cost increase. You only need to look at the experience of the Royal Navy in trying to regain skills as the production of the ASTUTE class was ever more delayed to realise that even a short gap can have huge consequences. In the case of Canada the reality is that it will be nearly 25 years since they last built an escort vessel – there are not likely to be many people out there still in work with the skills and experience of doing it, and the build programme is unlikely to be smooth.

For the Royal Navy, what is happening to Canada should serve as a warning that further delays to the Type 26 Frigate could prove ultimately very costly. The loss of a national ship building capability is great if you want to procrastinate and not order new vessels, but proves enormously expensive when you decide you still want to be a maritime power. It also highlights the strong allure of ‘nationally designed and built’ warships which are seen as a symbol of national pride.

This is the curious irony of modern warship design – many nations are currently in the market for new escorts, yet all aspire to build their own home-grown design. Meanwhile the designs talk about exportability as key parts of the means to reduce cost – in other words many nations want to build their own, yet expect to export to others in exactly the same boat. Unlike many military bits of hardware, ships are a very strong symbol of national pride and importance. Those ‘top tier’ navies want their own vessels, not just for sentimental nationality reasons, but also to give them control over the design and ensure they have a hull which meets their needs and is upgradeable as they wish. Reliance on overseas manufacturers is never great when you want to be certain your supply chain and export licences will come through when required.

But, for Canada it is possibly approaching the point where it is too late to do anything other than buy a foreign design. The fleet is aging and the Halifax class are approaching the point where they cannot easily be upgraded or modified. Much as throwing good money after an old car becomes pointless after a while, a decision will need to be taken soon as to when to stop spending the money. In the interim I suspect most Canadian Admirals will be praying that a class wide fault that can’t be rectified isn’t identified, as if the 330s can’t go to sea, then that is the end of Canada as a seagoing power.