Showing posts with label Syria. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Syria. Show all posts

Thursday, 10 December 2015

An enduring blitzkrieg?

The Daily Telegraph had a commentary recently by Andrew Gilligan which complained that despite claims that the UK would ‘blitz’ targets in Syria, there is no sign of it actually occurring, and thus the UK isn’t a major military player in the campaign. These sort of articles are frustrating because they fundamentally ignore the realities of modern war. While its easy to want to imagine that the moment an operation is approved, the sky should darken with the weight of airpower descending to flatten the opposition, things aren’t really as easy as that in reality.

The perception during the World War Two and the Cold War was that airpower was something that could provide quick responses, wiping out armour and infantry with ease, and smashing enemy command posts with little difficulty. The first Gulf War did little to counter this impression, and if anything highlighted how easy it can be in benign environments with control of the air all but assured and no real air defence threat present to dominate the land environment. In those circumstances, where you have a clearly defined threat and set of targets, it is easy to employ airpower with significant effect.

The problem we face today is that the enemy is one who we cannot compile an ORBAT for in the same way as volumes were done for the Russians or Iraqis. This is primarily an intelligence gathering battle, slowly but surely understanding the war we are fighting, the way our enemy works and trying to understand his pattern of life and activities.

There is no point in expending vast amounts of expensive ordnance wiping out abandoned buildings or empty positions. The media often think war is like a video game where one enemy after another runs at you and needs to be shot or else. In fact modern war is a far more complex and challenging business – its often slow, with little discernible action occurring, interspersed with occasional outbreaks of sheer terror.

The difficulty for any aerial intervention is that it needs to know what to target, when and why. In a warzone where there are flexible front lines, and fighters who resemble civilians, and civilians who resemble fighters, trying to build up this understanding takes time. It also takes time to work out where to strike, which facilities are used, what are actually schools or hospitals and what the pattern of life is. Some may expect UK jets to roar into action and drop bombs as they wish, but in fact weapons release is the exception rather than the rule – why expend ordnance for no reason, or worse on targets that perhaps are not what you think they are?

The air war in Syria will be slow, it needs time to establish a routine and work out what to strike and when. We cannot assume it will be over by Christmas – to do that means working out what victory looks like and what it is we want to deal with when the war is over. Instead this is a slowly burning campaign, a missile here, a bomb there. It relies on our opponents to provide us with credible targets, not bombing indiscriminately in the hope of hitting something useful. In many ways it resembles the No Fly Zones over Iraq in the early 1990s, where for over a decade the UK and US fought a practically undeclared war against Iraqi air defences, often releasing weapons when required; this quickly became a forgotten campaign.

As the campaign progresses targets may become clearer, or they may become more fleeting as the enemy lurks away from the reach of the air. It is telling that even the US armed forces, who make up nearly 80% of the airpower in the region are operating at a relatively low tempo of strikes – this isn’t because of a lack of airpower, but because this is a campaign that is slow and effective. This will probably not be a war of dambusters and sweeping strikes, but a methodical approach which delivers results with minimal collateral damage and maximum effect on our enemies.

There is always a natural desire to want to do as much as possible as quickly as possible – the so-called ‘shock and awe’ approach – witness for instance the sight of Charles De Gaulle, the sole French aircraft carrier deploying to conduct strikes in Syria, in part as a response to the Paris attacks. In the short term, she adds considerable power and capability, but at the cost of  tying up the sole French carrier as part of a wider campaign, and needing to come off station at some point soon for repairs and refit, without a French replacement.

The UK approach, of keeping a numerically small but sustainable and enormously capable force deployed to the Middle East seems eminently sensible. It provides enough mass to deal with most credible threats that are likely to be faced (essentially an insurgent force with limited capability), but can be kept there for the enduring future. To deploy a larger multi-squadron force would be feasible, but would place strain on long term sustainment, and cause personnel disruption that could be difficult downstream – too many long deployments will always test the goodwill of people, who may easily be tempted elsewhere for the benefits of a family life.

We also forget just how capable modern aircraft are – focusing on numbers is but one part of the problem. The modern Typhoon and Tornado combination provide an astounding level of air defence, air to ground and ISTAR capability, and can quickly be retasked – for instance in Libya the Typhoons there were flying air defence and ground attack missions within the same sortie. You don’t need 100 aircraft to have an effect now when the modern missiles can easily hit the precise target they’re aiming at with little risk of missing. Previously you’d have had to drop ‘dumb bombs’ which would miss, or go back so many times that you’d need multiples of aircraft to achieve the same effect as one can do now.

We’re in this for the long term and unlike many of our NATO allies and coalition partners, we have sufficient mass and capability to deploy a sustainable and credible long term presence in the region. So while the initial numbers may seem small to some, don’t forget that this is an enduring commitment and that it will be there for quite some time to come in addition to a wide range of other operations going on around the world at any one time. For many nations, this sort of deployment is the one thing that they can do, instead of other deployments.


So for me at least, I’m not worried about the idea that somehow our contribution is worthless because I don’t think that’s the case at all. We’re pulling our weight here and around the world, and helping in a measured sustainable way. 

Sunday, 29 November 2015

Do numbers matter?


Something I've often asked myself is why there is such a fixation in some quarters about the numbers game in defence. As a nation we so often focus on why we have 'only’ got X planes or Y ships deploying on a operation without looking at the bigger picture. For instance, in the Daily Mail today, there is an article (HERE) which suggests that the UK has no spare Tornadoes, and would apparently be a laughing stock if it deployed to operations in Syria.

Perhaps the first question to ask is ‘why’? Why would it matter if the UK only deployed 12 Tornadoes to Cyprus to conduct ops in Syria. The UK contribution in the Middle East is already more substantial than any other nation bar the US, and currently France. By this I mean that there is a wide ranging and hugely capable force in the region. This includes strike aircraft, RPAS assets, ISTAR platforms and tankers etc plus a substantial sovereign infrastructure at RAF Akrotiri – this all adds up into a very potent force, providing real capability to the coalition efforts in the region. Before we start flogging ourselves to death over a small number of aircraft that may or may not contribute, lets focus on what is already doing sterling work in the region and build on that.

What would additional capability mean to the package that’s already there? Part of the challenge in building a coalition is to try and get a broad range of assets into play – too many nations seem to want to contribute the high end ‘sexy stuff’ like fast jets. But what are they there to do? One only has to look at whats going on in Iraq to realise that while there is a wide need for airpower in all its many guises, there isn’t necessarily a huge list of targets to choose from on a daily basis. You only need to look at the MOD website to realise that the list of targets being hit on OP SHADER is often not that high – while there is a need for daily flights in the region, it’s often the case that targets are not often readily apparent.

A wider point I think people often forget is that too often we focus on the headline figure of ‘only 8’ without thinking about what that actually means. A commitment to 8 aircraft means a sustained deployment of 8 airframes able to meet any tasking asked of them on an enduring 24/7 basis until the end of the operation. This is actually quite a draining thing to do – many nations can do a short term detachment, maybe for 6 months, and then reduce or change their commitment. This so-called surge capability is at the heart of many nations defence planning (e.g. the UK is committed to surging 50,000 personnel and equipment on a deployment as its ultimate goal). But there is a big difference between short term surges and long term drumbeats of operations.

To keep 8 aircraft flying and available, and to then add a further 50% to the force means asking a lot – it’s not just the planes turning up on the day, it’s the availability of airframes back in the UK. It’s the extra ground crew, support staff, logistics and all manner of other kit that is needed to keep the deployment on the road. This isn’t easy to do and actually places a lot of stress on the Force. So, when throwing figures around about deployments, I always try to remember that its not just the aircraft on the frontline, but the wider support elements we need to keep track of too. If you surge for one big operation, then you run the real risk of not being able to properly sustain and support ongoing operations for some time to come.

For instance at the moment there is some cover in the UK press about the French deploying Charles De Gaulle (their carrier) out to the Middle East, and using it for airstrikes. While this will temporarily bring an additional 24-30 jets into the region, it’s not sustainable for the medium term and can only support operations until she needs to withdraw for maintenance or return home – at which point there is no other capability available. So, for a short term surge, it makes the French provide a hugely potent and impressive capability. For medium – long term sustainability, she is less useful.
But it’s easy to be seduced by the argument that an impressive visual capability now means more than a long term low key presence, despite the latter arguably having more long term impact and effect.

The Tornado force itself isn’t easily able to generate large numbers of aircraft – its’ an older fleet now, and while exceptionally capable, is running down in terms of both fleet numbers and crews.to sustain it on longer term operations will require careful management of the force and its people to ensure that its able to do what is asked of it. There is no point surging it all for a 6 month period if this places too great a strain on the support system and prevents the UK from sustaining the deployment.

To my mind too, the question I try to understand when I see articles like this is ‘what exactly are we trying to prove here’? Its’ all very well saying that the UK is somehow less relevant simply because it happens to not have that large a specific force or assets deployed on one mission or another – but why does this matter? It won’t substantially change the UK’s position in the world as a major diplomatic, economic or political power. Having 8 or 12 not 24 or 72 bombers for the long haul won’t significantly alter the speed of victory. I do think this is about long term commitment and not short term posturing that makes the difference here.

It feels that there is a desire to do the UK down and say ‘we don’t matter’ not because we aren’t contributing, but because people don’t seem to understand that sustained campaigns will be won over time. This is a long marathon of a race identifying targets carefully, not a short term sprint in a target rich environment.

To my mind the self-flagellation we’re seeing comes from a generation which looks back to the world of 50-70 years ago where large numbers of military equipment was needed to have an effect, and where enormous armies were commonplace. Today the world is a vastly different place, and military technology has changed significantly. The need for large forces has been replaced by a need for precision effect, and accurate targeting. There is no popular public support for striking indiscriminately to take out targets (and rightly so), but this does mean that the large forces of yesteryear are no longer affordable, replaced instead with good quality, but smaller, numbers of highly capable aircraft.


What the UK can seem to provide to any air campaign in Syria is the same as Iraq – first rate aircraft with a diverse package of capability (particularly the Brimstone missile) and sensors which enable not only kinetic action to be  taken, but also good intelligence gathered too (the RAPTOR pod on the GR4 is a particularly good example of this). The UK may not be deploying in large numbers, but it is deploying kit that is needed, is valued by our allies and keenly sought after, as part of our wider forces. We should be wary of doing ourselves down too much, knowing that we’ve got a very competent capability out there that can be sustained for the long haul.