Rusting out into the sunset - is it the end for the Royal Canadian Navy?

The Canadian Navy is an organisation that I’ve long been fascinated by - its history, culture and quiet decline in size, but not professionalism are simultaneously gripping and tragic. In many ways the Commonwealth Navies represent a vision of what could come to pass for the Royal Navy in years to come if sufficient funding isn’t allocated to it.

The one constant in recent Canadian naval history is the deep reluctance of Canadian politicians to actually order warships (proper warships), but instead rely on a legion of powerpoint presentations to talk about Canadas great naval future on whichever planned shipbuilding programme is in vogue that day.

The root of Canadian problems in recent years stems back to a lack of funding to replace the two classes of ship that have really made up the mainstay of the Canadian fleet since the end of the Cold War – the Iroquois class destroyers (the 280s) and the Halifax class frigates (330s). The 280s have their roots in the early 1960s, optimised as four big helicopter carrying destroyers intended to tackle soviet submarines in a cold war conflict. Heavily modernised throughout the Cold War and beyond, they have long been worked hard and are in challenging material state. Two were paid off in June, but one (HMCS ATHABASKAN) continues on, now well past 40 years old.

The 330s were optimised as ASW frigates to replace the post war construction types (Canada built a variety of excellent modified Type 12 frigates) and provide a more modern capability to the fleet during the much needed 1980s modernisation period (a time which even saw the Canadians contemplate acquisition of SSNs). A total of 12 hulls were built, entering service from 1992 by two shipyards which were effectively established to build them, but then failed to secure any follow on orders.  The result has been that since the mid-1990s, the Canadians have had to rely on two primary ship classes, getting ever older, but without any sign of actual hulls hitting the water (or even having steel cut) to replace them.

Meanwhile their tanker situation got even worse, originally there were three tankers (the Protector class) dating back to the 1960s which provided the fleet train capability. Age and infirmity has again reared its ugly head and these vessels have all now been paid off without (to date) replacement. In the interim Canada has been contemplating a variety of alternatives, including the chartering of tanker ‘sea days’ from nations like Spain and Chile, and deploying contingents onto foreign vessels to keep critical maritime skills alive.

Today there are two great hopes for the future of Canadian procurement – firstly the existence of Joint Support Ships (essentially a heavily modified Berlin class AOR) and a Single Surface Combatant intended to provide 15 escort ships against a total budget of some nearly $30 billion . In reality both programmes seem highly unlikely to deliver as anticipated – the SSC programme has been through various iterations, and yet despite this the number of hulls planned has never officially dropped down, despite inflation and other costs occurring. In 2011 a contract was awarded worth $25 billion to build new escorts and tankers for the Canadian Navy, but to date steel has not been cut on a single vessel.

The plan appears to be to construct some form of design in Canada (whether foreign or home design is not completely clear yet) through a single company. This in turn was intended to provide 15 hulls optimistically hitting the water from 2018 onwards. To put this in sharp perspective, Canada is currently contemplating trying to establish a highly complex warship construction facility from scratch, to build, integrate, operate and deploy these vessels in a hugely ambitious time frame, when it is nearly 20 years since they last went through a similar process.

What is likely in reality is that the programme will further slip, that there will not be vessels in the water as planned and that the budget which is going to be ever more challenged will not be available to afford anywhere near as many as 15 hulls. The RCN is likely to find itself in a similar situation to the RN over the Type 45 programme which went from 12 planned hulls to 6, but the cost savings were minimal as production costs decrease as programmes continue due to efficiencies of scale. In other words Canada will be paying more for less…

In practical terms, we appear to be near the point where Canada ceases to have a credible blue water navy. With a surface fleet where the youngest escort is 19 years old, and with credible replacements realistically half a decade away, it is hard to see how the Canadians can continue to operate at the high end of the warfighting spectrum with taking serious and significant risks.

Halifax Class Frigate

The one tiny glimmer of hope is that there are plans afoot to do an enormously ambitious and complex conversion of a merchant ship into a stop gap AOR to provide a limited tanker capability (replacing 3 platforms with 1) for a limited time until the putative JSS arrive. In reality the programme (known as Project Resolve) will provide a short term (2-3 year) cover but one cannot help but suspect that this make-work solution will in time become the only tanker left to the Canadians. It seems unlikely that having provided this ship, that she will be disposed of so quickly, particularly if construction continues and budgets tighten. That of course assumes the conversion works to time and to cost, which can never be assured.

Whatever the end, the reality is that for several years to come, Canada will be without a credible tanker on at least one coast, and reliant on the largesse and goodwill of NATO or Pacific Rim allies to support her ships on deployment.  Why does this matter so much? Well the imminent demise of a NATO navy is never a good sign – it’s something that reduces the number of credible warships available to commit to NATO missions, and increases the burden on those countries who do have vessels.

It highlights the reality that warship building is an immensely complex and time consuming business – if you drop out of the game and take a gap, even for a short time, the skills fade is considerable, as is the cost increase. You only need to look at the experience of the Royal Navy in trying to regain skills as the production of the ASTUTE class was ever more delayed to realise that even a short gap can have huge consequences. In the case of Canada the reality is that it will be nearly 25 years since they last built an escort vessel – there are not likely to be many people out there still in work with the skills and experience of doing it, and the build programme is unlikely to be smooth.

For the Royal Navy, what is happening to Canada should serve as a warning that further delays to the Type 26 Frigate could prove ultimately very costly. The loss of a national ship building capability is great if you want to procrastinate and not order new vessels, but proves enormously expensive when you decide you still want to be a maritime power. It also highlights the strong allure of ‘nationally designed and built’ warships which are seen as a symbol of national pride.

This is the curious irony of modern warship design – many nations are currently in the market for new escorts, yet all aspire to build their own home-grown design. Meanwhile the designs talk about exportability as key parts of the means to reduce cost – in other words many nations want to build their own, yet expect to export to others in exactly the same boat. Unlike many military bits of hardware, ships are a very strong symbol of national pride and importance. Those ‘top tier’ navies want their own vessels, not just for sentimental nationality reasons, but also to give them control over the design and ensure they have a hull which meets their needs and is upgradeable as they wish. Reliance on overseas manufacturers is never great when you want to be certain your supply chain and export licences will come through when required.

But, for Canada it is possibly approaching the point where it is too late to do anything other than buy a foreign design. The fleet is aging and the Halifax class are approaching the point where they cannot easily be upgraded or modified. Much as throwing good money after an old car becomes pointless after a while, a decision will need to be taken soon as to when to stop spending the money. In the interim I suspect most Canadian Admirals will be praying that a class wide fault that can’t be rectified isn’t identified, as if the 330s can’t go to sea, then that is the end of Canada as a seagoing power.

Do numbers matter?

Something I've often asked myself is why there is such a fixation in some quarters about the numbers game in defence. As a nation we so often focus on why we have 'only’ got X planes or Y ships deploying on a operation without looking at the bigger picture. For instance, in the Daily Mail today, there is an article (HERE) which suggests that the UK has no spare Tornadoes, and would apparently be a laughing stock if it deployed to operations in Syria.

Perhaps the first question to ask is ‘why’? Why would it matter if the UK only deployed 12 Tornadoes to Cyprus to conduct ops in Syria. The UK contribution in the Middle East is already more substantial than any other nation bar the US, and currently France. By this I mean that there is a wide ranging and hugely capable force in the region. This includes strike aircraft, RPAS assets, ISTAR platforms and tankers etc plus a substantial sovereign infrastructure at RAF Akrotiri – this all adds up into a very potent force, providing real capability to the coalition efforts in the region. Before we start flogging ourselves to death over a small number of aircraft that may or may not contribute, lets focus on what is already doing sterling work in the region and build on that.

What would additional capability mean to the package that’s already there? Part of the challenge in building a coalition is to try and get a broad range of assets into play – too many nations seem to want to contribute the high end ‘sexy stuff’ like fast jets. But what are they there to do? One only has to look at whats going on in Iraq to realise that while there is a wide need for airpower in all its many guises, there isn’t necessarily a huge list of targets to choose from on a daily basis. You only need to look at the MOD website to realise that the list of targets being hit on OP SHADER is often not that high – while there is a need for daily flights in the region, it’s often the case that targets are not often readily apparent.

A wider point I think people often forget is that too often we focus on the headline figure of ‘only 8’ without thinking about what that actually means. A commitment to 8 aircraft means a sustained deployment of 8 airframes able to meet any tasking asked of them on an enduring 24/7 basis until the end of the operation. This is actually quite a draining thing to do – many nations can do a short term detachment, maybe for 6 months, and then reduce or change their commitment. This so-called surge capability is at the heart of many nations defence planning (e.g. the UK is committed to surging 50,000 personnel and equipment on a deployment as its ultimate goal). But there is a big difference between short term surges and long term drumbeats of operations.

To keep 8 aircraft flying and available, and to then add a further 50% to the force means asking a lot – it’s not just the planes turning up on the day, it’s the availability of airframes back in the UK. It’s the extra ground crew, support staff, logistics and all manner of other kit that is needed to keep the deployment on the road. This isn’t easy to do and actually places a lot of stress on the Force. So, when throwing figures around about deployments, I always try to remember that its not just the aircraft on the frontline, but the wider support elements we need to keep track of too. If you surge for one big operation, then you run the real risk of not being able to properly sustain and support ongoing operations for some time to come.

For instance at the moment there is some cover in the UK press about the French deploying Charles De Gaulle (their carrier) out to the Middle East, and using it for airstrikes. While this will temporarily bring an additional 24-30 jets into the region, it’s not sustainable for the medium term and can only support operations until she needs to withdraw for maintenance or return home – at which point there is no other capability available. So, for a short term surge, it makes the French provide a hugely potent and impressive capability. For medium – long term sustainability, she is less useful.

But it’s easy to be seduced by the argument that an impressive visual capability now means more than a long term low key presence, despite the latter arguably having more long term impact and effect.

The Tornado force itself isn’t easily able to generate large numbers of aircraft – its’ an older fleet now, and while exceptionally capable, is running down in terms of both fleet numbers and crews.to sustain it on longer term operations will require careful management of the force and its people to ensure that its able to do what is asked of it. There is no point surging it all for a 6 month period if this places too great a strain on the support system and prevents the UK from sustaining the deployment.

To my mind too, the question I try to understand when I see articles like this is ‘what exactly are we trying to prove here’? Its’ all very well saying that the UK is somehow less relevant simply because it happens to not have that large a specific force or assets deployed on one mission or another – but why does this matter? It won’t substantially change the UK’s position in the world as a major diplomatic, economic or political power. Having 8 or 12 not 24 or 72 bombers for the long haul won’t significantly alter the speed of victory. I do think this is about long term commitment and not short term posturing that makes the difference here.

It feels that there is a desire to do the UK down and say ‘we don’t matter’ not because we aren’t contributing, but because people don’t seem to understand that sustained campaigns will be won over time. This is a long marathon of a race identifying targets carefully, not a short term sprint in a target rich environment.

To my mind the self-flagellation we’re seeing comes from a generation which looks back to the world of 50-70 years ago where large numbers of military equipment was needed to have an effect, and where enormous armies were commonplace. Today the world is a vastly different place, and military technology has changed significantly. The need for large forces has been replaced by a need for precision effect, and accurate targeting. There is no popular public support for striking indiscriminately to take out targets (and rightly so), but this does mean that the large forces of yesteryear are no longer affordable, replaced instead with good quality, but smaller, numbers of highly capable aircraft.

What the UK can seem to provide to any air campaign in Syria is the same as Iraq – first rate aircraft with a diverse package of capability (particularly the Brimstone missile) and sensors which enable not only kinetic action to be  taken, but also good intelligence gathered too (the RAPTOR pod on the GR4 is a particularly good example of this). The UK may not be deploying in large numbers, but it is deploying kit that is needed, is valued by our allies and keenly sought after, as part of our wider forces. We should be wary of doing ourselves down too much, knowing that we’ve got a very competent capability out there that can be sustained for the long haul.